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Abstracts
The representative theory of  perception is one of  the realist theories of  per-
ception which maintains we do not have direct access to the objects of  percep-
tion; our ideas represent some objective objects in the world. In this paper, I 
will address the question about the representative nature of  mental ideas from 
a Thomistic perspective. I will explore if  some Thomists are entitled to claim 
that Aquinas’ theory of  knowledge based on his metaphysics can provide a ba-
sis for resolving this issue. I will argue that this question is wrong-headed and 
it should be replaced with the following question: If  we assume the existence 
of  a real world and that we are not under the influence of  hallucination, how 
we can know that our ideas truly represent the world?
La teoria rappresentativa è una delle teorie “realiste” della percezione, le quali 
affermano che non è possibile avere un accesso diretto agli oggetti di percezio-
ne, per cui le nostre idee rappresentano solo gli oggetti nel mondo. In questo 
contributo, mi propongo di avvicinare la questione della natura rappresentati-
va delle idee mentali da una prospettiva tomista, tenendo anche in conto che 
per alcuni seguaci dell’Aquinate la teoria della conoscenza da lui formulata 
poteva effettivamente offrire una soluzione al problema. A mio avviso, la que-
stione deve essere così riformulata: se si assume l’esistenza di un mondo reale, 
e nel contempo si è certi di non essere in uno stato di allucinazione, come è 
possibile affermare che le idee veramente rappresentano il mondo?
Keywords
Representative theory of  perception; Hylomorphism; Thomism; the identity Theory 
of  Truth; Truth
Quest’opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere 
derivate 4.0 Internazionale.
Introduction: the representative Theory of  Perception 
and its Problems1
The representative theory of  perception is associated 
with indirect realism as opposed to direct or naïve realism. 
Naïve realism holds that our apprehension of  objects is direct 
and unmediated. In this view, the object of  knowledge has 
the properties which we subjectively perceive. The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy states that according to direct realism 
“tastes, sounds, and colours are not in the heads of  perceivers; 
they are qualities of  the external objects that are perceived” (Ted 
Honderich 1995, p.602). As opposed to direct realism, indirect 
realism holds that the perceiver is most immediately only aware 
of  his subjective apprehensions, and that his knowledge of  the 
objective world which is independent of  his mind derives from 
this subjective experience (Ted Honderich 1995, p.770).
The “New Way of  Ideas” in Descartes and Locke – 
which represent this indirect realism – indicates that we in the 
first instance are only aware of  the ideas in our minds through 
which we finally become aware of  the real objects in the world 
(Nick Jones 2009, pp.44-45).
Descartes and Locke pursue two different kinds of  
indirect realism, which have been called inferential realism and 
representative realism respectively. The fundamental difference 
lies in the way the passage from ideas to objects occurs. For 
Descartes, the passage occurs via reasoning from ideas; in this 
1 In considerazione del fatto che il presente contributo viene da una realtà 
accademica in cui lo stile bibliografico adottato è desunto dal Chicago Manual 
of  Style, si è ritenuto opportuno mantenere la formattazione originale dei rinvii 
bibliografici (NdE).
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view, the senses per se do not and cannot inform us of  the way 
real objects are (Nick Jones 2009, p.45). 
By comparison, the standard interpretation of  Locke 
in this regard is that the representative ideas are either like, or 
in fact are, little images or pictures of  the objects in question, 
and that an idea represents an object by resembling it (Nick 
Jones 2009, p.45). In this view, at least the primary qualities of  
objects like their sizes and shapes are related to the ideas via a 
resemblance relation. This resemblance relation is the heart of  
the problem I am going to deal with here on some Thomistic 
grounds. The question is that how we can arrive from subjective 
ideas to a knowledge of  real objects; in other words, how we 
can know that our ideas are truly representative of  a real world.
In my view, and for this I will argue, this question is 
wrong-headed and I would like to replace it with the following 
question: If  we assume the existence of  a real world and that we 
are not under the influence of  hallucination, how we can know 
that our ideas truly represent the world? The former question is 
seeking a way to justify the existence of  the world independently 
of  our minds. As I will show later, arguments to this effect are 
not convincing and end up assuming what they are trying to 
justify; rather than proving it existence. This is why I meant by 
saying that this question is wrong-headed.
Some Thomists have claimed that the Thomistic approach 
to knowledge can resolve this problem. In their arguments, they 
have not necessarily used the terminology of  the “representative 
theory of  perception’; they have mostly referred to issues like 
that of  the mind-body problem and Cartesian doubt which I 
think share the main problematic of  the representative theory 
of  perception, since all revolve around the question about 
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how mental entities can represent the outside world. Before 
attending to these Thomistic arguments, I distinguish between 
two interpretations of  the representative theory of  perception, 
i.e. the three-term and the two-term interpretation.
The three-term interpretation of  this theory states that 
there are three parts in this theory and in our perception: 
the perceiver, the object perceived and the idea caused in the 
perceiver at the end of  a long causal chain. This interpretation 
was common in the 17th and 18th century (G. Dicker 2011, p.28).
The problem with this interpretation concerns how the 
perceiver can be certain of  the existence of  the external object, 
since he might have received the idea through some kind of  
hallucination or dream and not from the external object. This 
interpretation came under attack after about 1950, and a two-
term theory of  perception became a commonplace (G. Dicker 
2011, p.28).
According to the two-term interpretation, the perceived 
object at the end of  the causal chain appears in some way to the 
perceiver. If  the idea is not treated as an extra object, or is not 
reified there would not be three distinct parts in perception. (G. 
Dicker 2011, p.19).
In my view, the Thomistic arguments are attempting to 
stick to the latter interpretation, i.e. the two-term interpretation. 
Their arguments can be broken into two general groups as 
follows.
1- Ascribing an identity theory of  truth, instead of  the 
correspondence theory of  truth to Aquinas
2- Seizing on the active engagement between the intellect 
and the object through perception, each of  which I will now 
explain.
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1. Argument from the Identity Theory of  Truth
 
According to the identity theory of  truth, the relation 
between the truth-maker – like external objects – and the 
truth-bearer, like propositions, is not a correspondence relation; 
rather, they should be identical with each other.
Some advocates of  the identity theory of  truth hold there 
is a kind of  continuity between the intellect when is thinking 
truly and the world. John McDowell (1994) puts this idea as 
follows.
… there is no ontological gap between the sort of  thing one 
can mean, or generally the sort of  thing one can think, and 
the sort of  thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, 
what one thinks is what is the case. … there is no gap between 
thought, as such, and the world. Of  course thought can be dis-
tanced from the world by being false, but there is no distance 
from the world implicit in the very idea of  thought (J.McDow-
ell 1994, p.27). 
However, it is by no means clear that how mental entities can be 
regarded as the continuation of  the world taking into account 
the fact that they belong to different categories, i.e. physical and 
non-physical. 
Along much the same line as this two-term interpretation, 
P. Kreeft (2009, p.64) states that the relation of  mind and reality 
is a problem applying to the correspondence theory of  truth. In 
his view, the problem with this theory is that it assumes some kind 
of  thing in the mind – mental forms – whose correspondence 
relation with reality proves to be problematic. The problem is 
the same problem which occurs for the representative theory of  
perception. 
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Kreeft in his identity theory of  truth, along the lines of  the 
two-term representative theory of  perception, argues against the 
reification of  ideas in the intellect. He argues that Aquinas does 
not face the representative problem since his theory of  truth is 
an identity theory of  truth and not a correspondence theory. 
The main point is that, in Kreeft’s view, the correspondence 
interpretation of  Aquinas’s theory of  truth “thingifies” ideas in 
mind; this interpretation takes the ideas in the mind to be as 
material signs like a map or a finger whose relations with the 
objective world are problematic. Instead, Kreeft ascribes the 
term “formal signs” to Aquinas, according to which signs are 
not things to be known firstly, and then their relation with reality 
to be examined. This view, in his analysis, will be trapped in 
Scepticism. As opposed to this, Kreeft maintains, the technical 
term “formal signs” used by Aquinas implies that forms are 
only means to knowing the external world. In Kreeft’s view, 
formal signs are pure signs and not things at all. These formal 
signs are mental acts of  pointing to objects; they themselves 
are not things the relations of  which to the real world pose an 
epistemological challenge. In this view, “there is a very form that 
both structures the matter outside our mind and structures the 
idea in our mind” (Kreeft 2009, p. 64).
I have not been able to locate such a terminology in 
Aquinas’ works, as is claimed by Kreeft; but the idea is present 
in Aquinas’ thought. Aquinas has mentioned this issue in the 
following arguments:
Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only 
the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is 
cognizant only of  the impression made on its own organ. Ac-
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cording to this theory, the intellect understands only its own 
impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has re-
ceived, so that this species is what is understood. This is, how-
ever, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things 
we understand are the objects of  science; therefore if  what 
we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it 
would follow that every science would not be concerned 
with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligi-
ble species within the soul;… Secondly, it is untrue, because 
it would lead to the opinion of  the ancients who maintained 
that “whatever seems, is true”, and that consequently 
contradictories are true simultaneously. For if  the fac-
ulty knows its own impression only, it can judge of  that only 
(The Summa Theological, hereafter ST, I.85.2). (Emphasis mine).
In my view, it is possible to take intelligible species mentioned 
by Aquinas not as independent objects, rather as mental signs 
which point to real objects. This interpretation fits with Kreeft’s 
idea of  formal signs.
I think Aquinas’ above arguments are not convincing, 
since they both reiterate the need to have access to the external 
object, and the consequences of  lacking such a knowledge; but 
he does not explain how mental forms can in fact represent the 
world. 
In addition, the notion of  pure formal signs ascribed by 
Kreeft to Aquinas constitutes the heart of  this epistemological 
challenge, and cannot resolve it. Asking how our ideas are related 
to and represent the outside world is another way of  questioning 
how pure these ideas are; in other words, it is a question about 
how human subjects are able to have signs that can purely 
represent the world without being tainted by psychological and 
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other aspects of  the individual’s their character or tradition.
In my view, it is more reasonable to take Aquinas’ theory 
as a correspondence theory of  truth, and then to consider it 
in the theological context which paves the way for a kind of  
epistemological reliabilism according to which we can rely on the 
representative character of  our senses and cognitive capacities. 
Accordingly, I think Kreeft’s formulation of  the identity theory 
of  truth cannot solve the problem of  the representative theory 
of  truth.
2. Argument from Active Metaphysical Object-Mind 
Engagement
The basic idea here is that since mind and object are 
both active in the process of  knowledge, and both undergo 
metaphysical changes in the knowledge process by the intellect 
receiving the form of  the object, the mind has not a problem 
in acknowledging that its ideas are representative of  the world. 
For Aquinas, the intellect is active in the knowledge-process. It 
makes intelligible species out of  phantasms which, themselves, 
arise in the imagination, as a product of  sensation (See Aquinas’ 
On the Uniqueness of  Intellect against Averroists, ch. IV). In Aquinas’ 
view (ST, I. Q.85 Art.1), truth consists in the conformity of  the 
intellect and object; in this process the intellect receives the form 
of  the object, and becomes identical with the thing formally not 
materially.
In this regard, Joseph Owens (1974, p.201) argues that 
in cognition both object and subject have active roles. The 
sensible through an efficient causal relation with the subject 
brings the agent into its own form, and thereby the thing 
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comes into cognitional existence in the agent. Though the 
long causal process between the thing and the agent is open to 
errors and slips that should be examined, the mind remains true 
and certain that the thing really exists in the external world. 
In Owens’ view (1974, p.204), pre-Cartesian philosophers 
were right in their putative account that we directly perceive 
things without attending to epistemological concerns about the 
representation of  real things by agents’ concepts. Both entities 
– the external and the cognitional – are grasped together. The 
external thing is grasped directly, and therewith the cognitional 
existence due to the agent’s co-formality with the object exists in 
the intellect. The agent’s awareness of  the cognitional existence 
is dependent on his perception of  the direct object. The agent 
only by perceiving sensible things in their real existence is able 
to have cognitional existence, and build further constructions 
upon them. The thing can be perceived and dealt with directly 
without any need for the mediation of  internal objects such as 
cognition and its products (Owens 1974, pp.203 & 205). 
As long as the agent at the end of  the causal chain receives 
the form of  the thing, his intellect becomes the thing perceived; 
so the kind of  physical distance that matters for physical things 
does not apply to cognition (Owens 1974, pp.197-8). Owens’ 
point that the intellect becomes the things refers to Aquinas’ 
definition of  truth as “the conformity of  thing and intellect” 
(Questiones Disputatae de Veritate I-1). In this view, the intellect and 
object become identical in form but not in the matter. 
In a word, if  I understand Owens correctly, the two 
entities – real and cognitive – are not of  a kind that give rise to 
the epistemological question about the representative character 
of  the cognitive entity. The real existence causes the agent to 
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have or to form the cognitive entity. Of  course, as indicated 
by Owens (1974, p.201), many things might happen along the 
causal relation depriving the agent of  a correct understanding 
of  the nature of  the thing; so our understanding should be open 
to scrutiny to eliminate habitual uncritical judgments about 
the nature of  the thing; however, the agent still is certain with 
regard to dealing with a real entity in the world, even while he 
has to correct his understanding via a dialectical process.
M. Derksen (2011, p.9) argues that the radical 
methodological doubt is not a discovery but a creation of  
modern philosophy caused by the domination of  subjectivity 
in knowledge and by the body/soul split. In this interpretation, 
this problem can be traced back to a Platonic epistemology, 
according to which soul is trapped in the body, and there is no 
essential relation between the two; rather, they are in war with 
each other, thus sensation cannot give us true knowledge of  
the real world. The radical bifurcation of  mind/body results 
in epistemology becoming a starting point for all subsequent 
philosophical inquiry. While according to the hylomorphism of  
Aristotle, every thing in nature is composed of  matter and form. 
Soul is the form of  body and they are not independent and 
distinct things (M. Derksen 2011, pp.9-13). 
Through sensation, Aristotle contends, the likeness or 
the formal existence of  the object comes to the intellect, just 
as a piece of  wax receives a seal without having the iron or the 
gold of  the signet-ring. The formal existence is in the intellect, 
and the material existence is in the world. In Aquinas’ terms, 
material form exists in the object, as cognitional form exists in 
the intellect. These forms do not represent things like Cartesian 
and post-Cartesian ideas, rather they present things in the world 
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(M. Derksen 2011, p.14-15). 
Thomas S. Hibbs (2007, p. 65) maintains, along similar 
lines, that in Aquinas’ view, pervasive doubt about all our 
knowledge is a fatal illusion. In his view, for Aquinas, doubt 
arises with regard to some claims of  knowledge against the 
backdrop of  what is known or assumed. Hibbs (2007, p. 65) 
explains the impossibility of  pervasive doubt for Aquinas as 
follows. The act of  knowing is the actualization of  soul. The 
self  is not constituted prior to such an act. It cannot actualize 
itself; rather, it should be realized by objects outside itself. The 
self  prior to its actualization cannot pose questions as to how 
it knows, and once actualised it is capable of  answering such 
questions only by presupposing its first acts of  knowing. 
To put things more simply, the self  for Aquinas is not 
sufficiently constituted previous to the acts of  knowing, and 
once it gets constituted it learns to answer questions about the 
reliability of  its knowledge by assuming its first acts of  knowing. 
I am tempted to add to this claim that even the act of  radical 
doubt is performed by an actualized self  whose actuality is 
indebted to the very process of  knowing he is trying to put into 
doubt. Accordingly such a doubt would be illegitimate for him 
to raise, since he is arguing against the very basis from which the 
doubt is derived. So Hibbs (2007, p. 55) concludes that Aquinas’ 
emphasis is on “wonders” and not on “doubts”.
I think wonder differs from doubt in that it is not as 
radical and extensive as doubt. Wonder is raised against the 
background of  certain claims to knowledge, and it is not seeking 
to doubt the very foundations of  knowledge. 
In my view, neither Aquinas’ theory of  knowledge nor his 
exegesis by the Thomists discussed above can resolve the problem 
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of  the representative theory of  perception. I think Aquinas’ 
theory of  knowledge assumes from the outset the existence of  
the real world and its objects. It is far from clear to me that 
the argument from active metaphysical engagement presented 
above can be used to prove such an existence, or to show how 
and why the knower does not need to meet such a challenge. 
The active mind-object engagement can be compatible with the 
agent’s illusions concerning what he takes to be a real object. 
This illusionary object, if  thought to be a real object, might 
work well as a real object to have active engagement with the 
mind. 
One way to show the possibility of  the occurrence of  
hallucination in Aquinas’ theory of  knowledge is along the 
following lines. According to Aquinas, mind makes an intelligible 
species out of  phantasm. Intelligible species is the likeness of  
things.
The hallucination problem here is that how we know 1- 
that the thing exists in the real world, and 2- that the intelligible 
species is the likeness of  the thing; in other words, if  we know 
the thing through the mind’s operation which produces the 
intelligible species, and we do not have direct access to the 
thing itself, how can we be certain that the likeness is really the 
similitude of  the thing? If  we do not have a direct knowledge 
of  the thing, how can we know for sure that something else is 
its likeness?
In Aquinas’ theory of  knowledge, our contact with the 
thing is via the intelligible species; so we do not have direct 
assess to the thing to recognise its similarity with the intelligible 
species; accordingly, both the existence of  the thing and its 
similarity with the intelligible species might be the products of  
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an illusion. The irony is that Aquinas himself  holds that the 
intelligible species is understood secondarily, and the object is 
understood primarily; 
But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it 
understands both its own act of  intelligence, and the species 
by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that 
which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily 
understood is the object, of  which the species is the likeness 
(ST. I.85.2). 
However, Aquinas’ theory does not explain, in my view, the 
primary understanding of  the object; as a result, I think the 
active relation between mind and object cannot prove to be 
immune to the charge of  possible illusion in his theory of  
knowledge.
The fact that Aquinas has not faced Cartesian radical 
doubts does not mean that he and his theory are logically 
immune to them. Furthermore, I wonder if  Descartes’ doubts 
concerning the existence of  the real world were genuine 
doubts. This kind of  doubt for Descartes has been a methodical 
assumption to see if  it is possible to base knowledge on some 
foundation which is not dubitable.
… because our senses deceive us sometimes, I was willing to 
assume that there was nothing which existed the way our sens-
es present it to us... I determined to pretend that everything 
which had ever entered my mind was no more true than the 
illusions of  my dreams… I saw that I could pretend that I had 
no body and that the world and the place where I was did not 
exist (Descartes 1637, part4). 
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As the quote shows, Descartes’ doubts are more like some kind 
of  assumption or pretention than a real doubt. Accordingly, I 
think Aquinas’ theory of  knowledge can in the like manner be 
logically open to such radical doubts, doubts which I think no 
sound mind normally would make due to its interaction and 
engagement with the world, an interaction that does not have to 
be along the lines of  Aquinas’ metaphysical engagement.
In my view, the mere fact that intellect plays an active 
role in acquiring and processing knowledge, and that it is 
not a passive recipient cannot resolve the question about its 
representative character, because it is possible for the intellect 
to be affected by some factors such as psychological and 
perspectival impediments resulting in a distorted picture of  the 
object. The individual’s characteristics including his prejudices 
and desires, and the limitations of  his perspective might deprive 
him of  a correct understanding of  the issue. 
However, I would suggest that the fact that Aquinas’ theory 
of  knowledge cannot resolve the problem of  the representative 
theory of  truth is not a flaw in this theory. In my view, this 
question is in principle a wrong-headed question. By this I mean 
the question is fundamentally wrong to ask. I am here arguing 
form the latter Wittgenstein’s perspective according to whom 
the idea that the world exists independently of  us is a part of  
our way of  life immune to both justification and repudiation (J. 
Lear 1982, p.395). Taking this belief  as a part of  our way of  life 
means that we cannot argue for it, rather we argue from it. 
Accordingly, instead of  arguing how Aquinas’ theory 
of  knowledge or any other theory can assure the agent of  the 
existence of  the real world, it would be better and more fruitful 
to argue about how mind can be certain that its accounts of  the 
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nature of  things are correct; in other words, the more relevant 
question is how mind can be assured that its accounts of  things 
are in agreement with their reality, instead of  arguing how we 
may be assured about the real existence of  things. 
One Thomist who is moving in the direction of  the 
question regarding the correspondence of  the content of  our 
ideas and theories with their objects is Alasdair MacIntyre. In his 
theory of  truth, MacIntyre has given a dialectical and fallibilistic 
aspect to Aquinas’ theory of  truth which to some extent is like 
the fallibilism of  Popper. In MacIntyre’s view (1988. p. 118), our 
theories should remain always open to falsification and the best 
theory surviving the objections can count as a true theory. As he 
puts it, “we may arrive at a conclusion as to which of  these best 
survives the strongest objections which can be advanced on the 
basis of  the others” (1988. p. 118). We can, tentatively, be assured 
of  the truth of  a theory if  it is capable of  surviving against the 
strongest counterevidence emerging against it (MacIntyre 2006, 
p.188). This approach is similar to the Fallibilism favoured by 
Popper; other than, MacIntyre, despite Popper, does not give up 
the ideal of  truth and the possibility of  arriving at truth. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I mentioned two sets of  Thomistic argument 
which can be offered as a response to the challenge of  the 
representative theory of  perception. The first argument was 
based on ascribing an identity theory of  truth to Aquinas, 
according to which the forms in the intellect are not things; 
rather they are pure signs which point to objects directly.
The problem with this theory concerned the question 
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how we can know that our mental forms are pure and not 
contaminated with distorting facts such as prejudices, desires, 
perspectival limitations and even hallucination; accordingly, this 
approach begs the question.
The second approach was centred upon the metaphysically 
active engagement between intellect and object required by the 
hylomorphism of  Aristotle and Aquinas according to which 
the knowledge process is process of  change and like any other 
kind of  change involves, from a Thomistic perspective, the 
actualization of  some potentialities. This kind of  actualization, 
in this view, renders the intellect assure of  the existence of  the 
real objects in the world. The problem with this was that the 
active engagement could still be based on what we sincerely take 
to be real even if  it is not real as a matter of  fact.
My alternative is to dissolve this question rather than 
resolving it by pursuing something like Wittgenstein’s notion 
of  the way of  life, according to which some principles like 
the existence of  an independent world are parts of  our ways 
of  life and the foundation of  our further argumentation 
which themselves cannot be and do not need to be justified. 
Instead of  what is conventionally meant by the problem of  the 
representative theory of  perception, I propose to ask the question 
about how we can rest assured that the content of  our ideas and 
theories correspond to reality. The Thomistic dialectical theory 
of  MacIntyre might be a good example in this category. 
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